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IN TilE SUl'lcJ:J;L COUHT

HMU/f;/ VJ liCl:IlT unci
hll/:r;:I: VJ ;;c;";:'J, his

1·1ifc,
Plain 1~i:C

fs und

RCSJ?OlJc1c.:nt::~,

Case No.

15311

VS.

ShLT LJd(E COUNTY I
Dcfcnd<.nt u.nc
Appellant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NA'l'URE OF THE CASE
This is o.n action for settling damage to a garage,
allegedly caused by a Salt Lake County storm drain.
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\'IEE COURT
A jury trial resulted in a judgment for the plaintiffs
in the amount of $15,645.00 which was later amended by the
court to the amount of $17,583.47.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment
in its favor as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial.
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ST!.'J

u.;,~;:·r

OF

Fl\C'!'~_;

In about l9S7 S2lt Lake County

in~lallcd

agc systc;,, ocross rc:<ll propu Ly knm·.·n

ilS

the

a sto1m
Eet~_: L.

d~ain

Olyn'[!lls

Heights SulYlivision.
building lot in the subdivision.

In the winter of

a house was constructed upon the lot.

19~9-GO

The plaintiff was

aware of the existence of the storm drain and its general
location along the south of his property, but didn't J;nmv
exactly

~here

it ran.

(Record G9).

For the first ten years that plaintiffs lived in the
house

the~

70).

In the spring of 1971, hov.·cver, plaintiff noticed some

had no problem with foundation settling.

small cracks in his garage.
so he ignored them.

(Eecord

They did not appear critical,

(Record 71).

In the spring of 1972 plaintiff noticed that the cracks
had 1·:idencd.

He wondered if the cracking could have some-

thing to do with the county storm drain, so he called Salt
Lake County Flood Control.

A few days later he called

again and was told that an inspection had been made and
that no correlation could be found between the cracks and
the storm drain.

(Record 72).

In the spring of 1973 the cracks had further widened.
The plaintiff again called Salt Lake County.

Again, Salt

Lake County inspected and could find no correlation between

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
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lhc

~lJlGLi~fs'

proLlcm and the storm drain.

(Record 73).

In aC:cJition, the door bc::cillne more
difficult to opcrutc.
to S;:.J

t

L~'kc

County

In !1a; of 1974 plaintiff again talked

pc::J:sonneJ, but "received no satisfaction."

(Hecord 73).
Throu'Jhout the

sumn~er

of 1974 plaintiff kept a close

eye on tl!e settling problcm.
who

thoug~l

the:;

proble~

He consultc:;d with a!l expert

was probably in&Cesuate footings.

In August Gf 1974 plaintiff hired a contractor to dig along
the side of his garage to check the footings.

The contrac-

tor found the ground around the footings to be wet.

Further

investigation revealed that the storm drain was leaking.
On August 30, 1974 plaintiff gave written notice to
Salt Lake County.

Plaintiff then brought this action on the

theories of nuisance and negligence.
ARGUHEN'l'
POINT ONE.

TEIS CLAD! IS BARRED BY UTAH

CODE l,NNOTi\TED §63-30-13

(1967).

Utah Code Ann. §63-30-13 provides:
A claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety c1,·1ys after the cause of action
arises;
A

cause of action arises the moment all of the elements

of the cause of action are present.

In a negligence case the

clcr.Knts arc:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1.

a duty,

2.

a

3.

proximate cause, and

br~ach

Prosser, Law of Torts

of

th~

duty

(ncgli~cncc),

(4th Ed. 1971) §30 at 143.

This Court held in O'llair v. Kouvalis, 23 Utcll1 2d 35'),
356, 463 P.2d 799, 800

(1970):

A cause of action or right of action arises
the moment an action may be maintained to enforce
it, and the statute of limitations is thc;n set in
motion.
In the case at bench all the elements of the cause of action
existed in

th~

spring of 1971 when the cracking first appeared.

Consolidated Irr. Dist., 119 P.2d 717

(Cal. 1941).

In that

case damage to real property had occurred as a result of a
leaking canal.

The plaintiff had failed to file its claim

with the irrigation district 1·1iU1in 'Lhe time fixed by the
claim statute.

In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff

the court held:
Damage such as that caused by seepage, it
is said, can occur so slowly that the injury
would not be discovered before the statutory
period lapsed.
The answer to this argument
lies in the fact that the claim provision as
a whole indicates no intention tlnt it is to
have a limited application, for the opcniny
clause includes within its scope any claim for
damage or injury to property resulting from
"any" dangerous or de:Lective condition brought
about by the district in the operation of its
worh;.
I·:Jwre __!he_ U l'le <1nd c:_:_tc:n~!_j,J~j u n·_~2:~
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119 P.2c1 at 721.

In the present cas<:> the elements of the cause of action
all existed in the spring of 1971; the plaintiff discovered
damage at that time; the notice was not filed until August
30, 1974, long after the 90 statute applicable to governrnental
entities had lapsed.
This Court held as early as 1883 that a statute of
limitations is not tolled by the plaintiff's ignorance of
his cau2e of action except in cases of fraud or concealment.
In Dec v. Hyland, 3 Utah 308, 3 P.388 (1883), the plaintiff's
horse disappeared.

More than three years later the plaintiff

saw the horse in the possession of the defendant.

The

defendant had purchased the horse shortly after the time
when the horse disappeared.

In affirming a judgment for the

defendant, the court said:
Where there is no proof of fraud on the part
of the defendant, the general rule is that the
time of limitations runs from the time of the
conunission of the wrongful act, or the right of
action accrues, and not from the time of the knowledge of the act by the plaintiff, there being no
proof of any wrongful conduct on the part of the
defendant by means of which that knowledge is
conceal~d from the plaintiff.
3 Utah at 314, 3 P. at 389-90.
This rule was reaffirmed by this court as recently as
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-5-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

(1974).

That cose involved the sale of securities sixteen

years prior to the action.

Justice llcnroicl, spci1kj

IVJ

for the

unanimous court held:
[P]laintiff clair's its decedent hiJcl no J:nov;ledge of such transfer and hence the stututc of
limitations would not start to run until discovery,
and knowledge thereof.
'l'he facts belie and defeot such an argument.
No fraud is alleged or shown.
Nothing is reflected
to indicate low blows, hidden microphones, smokefilled roo0s or deception.
522 P.2d at 710.
The

legisla~~re

has modified this rule, by statute, in

cases of fraud, mistake, taking or injuring of personal
property, and medical malpractice to allow the statute to
be tolled until the cause of action is discovered.

Utah

Code Ann. §78-12-26

(1977).

(1977); Utah Code Ann. §78-14-4

Some jurisdictions have also adopted this "discovery
rule" by judicial decree.
Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, have
adopted the discovery rule in the narrow fact situation involving medical malpractice cases

v~1ere

a foreign object

is left in a patient's body.

Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah

2d 199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968).

The reason most courts have

given for adopting this narrow exception is that the problems
of proof are minimized in foreign object cases since foreign
objects do not normally find their way into people's bodies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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except in
Cu,~C:

(U.J.

~;urqcr~'.

:c;cconrJl~,,

in this type of malpractice

the :acl that climugc is occurring is generally inherently

1961); EilJ:i_n_qc~ \'. Sist.0rs of ~'erc:y, 389 P.2d 224, 281

(Ic"iu. 1%4).
Some courts have extended this discovery rule to other
types of medical malpractice, and a few have extended it to
all types of professional malpractice on the theory that
a person of ordinary education is not capable of knowing
malpractice when it has occurred and may, therefore, be excused from filing his suit until he discovers the malpractice.
For example in Peters v. Simmons, 552 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wash.
1976) the Washington Supreme Court held that the discovery
rule applied to legal malpractice for the following reason:
The primary resaon for extending and applying the rule is because the consumer of profession2l services frequently does not have the
means or ability to discovery professional malpractice.
The \iasbington Court has, nevertheless, retained the
traditional rule in ordinary tort cases.
397 P. 2d 846

(~Jash.

Messes v. Shannon,

1964).

Similarly, in Neal v. Magna, Olney, Levy, Cathcart, &
Gelfand, 491 P.2d 421 (Cal. 1971) the California court adopted
the discovery rule as applied to legal malpractice but specifically stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In ordinary tort cmcJ conu·,,ct o.ct i CJIIO:, U1c
statute of ]imitation~, it is true, 0c0in~ to run
upon the occurre:ncc of the L1o:l clcn:c.nt c.•;,,c·nt iiil
to the causo of action.
Tlw pJ ,; int i.f f' '' i r;J·orance of the cousc of Jctic~o; o·r-iri·~--i-c',,-I1tTt.v
of the \•TOJlC~clocr (IOC53 nol:toTl-tT1~- ;~:c-,;c\.~i~Z·--:-·-~
(Emphu.sls

I

acldCd-:-)_______________ --------

491 P.2d at 428.
In Carlson v.

Ray Geophysical Division, 481 P.2d 327

(r1ont. 1971), the Montana Court held:
[T)he fact that a person entitled to an action
has no knowledge of his right to sue, or of the
facts out of which his right arises, does not, as
a gencr~l rule, prevent the running of the statute,
or postpone the conm1enccmcnt of the per icd of limitation, until he discovers the facts or learns of
his right thereunder.
481 P.2d at 329.
Certainly, any time that a plaintiff is foreclosed from
suing due to a statute of limitations, he may claim that an
injustice has resulted.

The legislature hils balanced this

danger, however, against the possible injustice that may
result from stale and fraudulent claims that are difficult
to defend against.
Furthermore, if the discovery rule should be applied
to any statute of limitations, it should not be applied to
the Governmental Immunity Act.

Host statutes of limitation

cut off a right existing at common law because of the passage
of time.

Conversely, the Governmental Immunity Act creates

a right, not existing at common law, upon certain conditions.
This court held in Scarborouc;h v. Granite School Distdct,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,-8may contain errors.

:031 P.:!cl ~80,

482

(Utah l97'i):

The Sc!Jc,oJ District is a political subdivisicJll of lhe: c;tatr_:. 'll"~l:· fore, it I'IOuld norrcally
be n,-,,r,uno fr'-ld :;ui t; c':Jc) the riqht to sue: is an
exception cro~tcd by statute. 0c have consistent lJ' hcJrl tl1i"t v.'hcrc a caus0 of action is
biJ:~ccl upon ii :Jtc1tntc, full complianc.:c \'lith its
rr'cjuir'ci~~''ntc; is a concJi tion precedent to the
ri r_;l1t to muintain a suj_ l .
The

le~islature

balanced the possible injustice of

barring legitimate claims against the needs of governmental
entities and enacted a statute which creates a right of
action if a claim is filed ·v1ithin 90 daJ•s a.fter the cause of
action arises.

The legislature created no exception.

None

should be created by this court.
POINT T\:0.
EVEl-l Di'WER THE "DISCOVLRY RULE"
THIS CASE MUST BE REVERSED.

If this court were to extend the discovery rule to
ordinary nuisance actions, this verdict still could not
stand.

The discovery rule as usually stated is that the

limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovered or

sho~ld

have discovered that he had a cause of

action.
Here the plaintiff discovered damage in 1971.

He

suspected that the county drain waS the cause in 1972. He
became even more suspicious in 1973.

He did not dig along

his foundution until the sunm1er of 1974.
Surely the issue of "should have discovered" is, at
best, a jury issue.

The trial court refused to submit this

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9-

issue to the jury.
POHJT Til FEE.
TilE LE!II: It;G ST01'J'i SE\ICP, \,'1\S
l\ "LA'l'ENT D:CFLCT."
The Utah Governmental Imrtunity l\cl Wilives yuJermncnL<ll
immunity for defects in pubU c improvcrt,cnts in Utah Code
Ann.

§ 6 3-3 0-9.

That section ulso provides, however:

Immunity is not waived for latent defective conditions.
This court has never interpreted this provision of the
Act.
This
among tort

pro~ision
clai~s

of Utah law is also apparently unique

acts, and there are no cases from other

jurisdictions providing guidunce.

In other contexts some

courts define latent conditions as those which are "not
discoverable by reasonable inspection."

Other courts hold

that a latent defect is one which is discoverable by proper
inspection but is not superficially discernible or plainly
apparent to the eye.

Owensby v. Jones, 136 S.E.2d 451, 456

(Ga. App. 1964).
Webster defines latent as:
lying hidden and undeveloped within a person or
thing, as a quality or power, as yet concealed;
unrevealed.
l'i'ebster's l'Jew Twenbeth Century Dictionary (2d ed. 1957).
Salt Lake County's position is that the legislature, in
preserving immunity for latent defective conditions, had in
mind situations exactly like that found in the present case.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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'l'l1c storrct c~roin Ho::; in operation 14 years before any problem

aroc:rc

(fro~'

drain

IIC>S

l9S7 to 1971).

Even then it 1·1as over three

n.udc.

In Salt Lake County and throughout the State, there are
l!unurcd:o of miles of storm C:rains.
construcLion; others are old.

Some are new, modern

Many, like the one in this

case, have functioned adequately for many years but may
begin leaking.

Some can be inspected by craHling through

them, although this may not disclose leaks.
small for a man to enter.

Others are too

The only way that Salt Lake

County could avoid possiole liability is to dig up and replace all the old storm drains in the county at horrendous
expense.

Because of the duration of a governmental entity's

existence, and because of the continual turnover in managing
personnel, the legislature provided that latent defects
would remain in the area of governmental immunity.
No better example of a latent defective condition could
be found than a buried storm drain, which operates perfectly
satisfactorily for 14 years and then begins to cause damage
by slowly seeping water underground.
The plaintiffs contend that they should be excused from
filing a notice of claim from 1971 when the damage began
until 1974.

If they are excused, it is only because the

defect was latent and, therefore, not reasonably discoverable.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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If the defect

\'.'ilS

lutc.:nt, the claim is barred; if it \Ja:; not

latent, the time for disco\'ery slJc,ulu not JJL tollul.
POI!iT FOUJZ.
'IllL: COCF'J E!<l~l~D r;; c;l,J:'.1TTTI ;:c:
TillS C7~SE 0:' THL Tlll~OJG (1]' STFlCT LU1UlLlTY.

The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
A nuisance is a cond:Lti(Jn, not an ilCl: or fil.ilto act on the port of tlw person rc:-i]JOnsiblc
the condition.
If thcc: \.<ronsful COl1c1ition e:-:ists,
the pel son char<Jcs therc·..·itl, ic; rCLJ on:c;iblc.: for
existence, he; is Li0blc for the rc:"''ltinq
da~1ac;eo: to othel·si'lTi:-:]c)-;::(1\''ilc-r;;:;·~-h<cvc-: u~ ·cl-tlK:_

ure
for
and
its

~~l~c~~-I~~P~;~~~.:~}~~~~~!J:r~~~Ef.· 6c·-~~~~~::~~~"~~7~ ~;f~f~H ~n
for-----a-il0-iS-~j 1~C c_-c~4D)10t -f)i-CYG·; ~~J tE"-cr· b-~~~~h-(~\7.i-1lCTtlhl·l- ___
~~~lt ·-'2.~=-_no-nc_CL i ~~-:!C~- on u~;;-jJ'irt ~[,_Li!lf:: de:- c.:J ;-..::

A nuisance does not rest on the degree of
care used, for that presents a question of negligence:', but on the degree of d0n0er existing even
with the best of care, the question of cure or
want of care is not involved. Thus, a person
who crcc:atcs or Etain'c,,.:.ns a nuisance is liable for
the rcc:sulting injury to others, without rcc:qard to
the deqree of care or sl:iJ 1 o:crcisc.·d-h~-TlTmto
avold the-in l ur-~~ and--noh:i tf1stiot-;:)Cf:L!i(i --Cri0~:-he-·
exercises rezLsonab~LeC,.r ordi-n00> co.rean2;-~S-JZill,
or eyen the highest possiilie dc'qre-e()Tccirc.-A nuisance may or may not be bascc:d in the
negligent act of thcc: one creating it. However, it
frequently is the conscc:quence of negligence, or the
samcc: acts or omissions which constitute ncc:;ligcc:nce
which may give rise to a nuisance. A lawful action
may become a nuisance by reason of its negligence
performance.
(Emphasis added).
This instruction to the cc:ffect that negligcc:nce is not
required in a nuisance is totally mislcc:ading to the jury and
clearly erroneous under Utah law.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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111

lJ1C

llLd: 2 i 2fcS,
J >'-~(_P

cj leu

1

Cc

:,(,8 P.2c1 70

Pro:;~:

(l'J71)

In that case this court

for the proposition:

J.ny of three· ty;A·:~ of conclc;ct may result in
Jjd]Ji lit)' fo1· a pri'vatc nuis<,rJCC.
By fur the
grcc< Lu.· nc.L·lJ'-'r of such nuisc r~ccs are intentional.

Today liability for nuisance may rest upon
an inlc·nlional invasion of lhc plaintiff's interests, or a negligent one, or conCuct ~hich
is abno~~al and out of place in its surroundings,
and so falls fairly within the principle of
strict liability.
2G Utub 2cl at 291-92, 488 P.2d at 745 citina Prosser, Lm·1 of

'l'orts

(3cl Eel.), Sec.

88, pp.

594-595.

The court also cited the Restatement of Torts as to
this issuc.
§822.

The Rcstatcmcnt provides:
General Rule.

The acto~ is liable in an action for damages
for a non-trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land if,
(a)

the other has property rights and privileges in respect to the use or enjo;rment
interfered with; and

(b)

the im·asion is substantial; and

(c)

tho actor's conduct is a legal cause of
the invasion; and

(d)

the invasion is either
(i)

intentional and unreasonable; or

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(ii)

c:;rjrl ()thr"r·..·i~;'
~Gf(_,--J.JJJ :_f _( __ t_l_l_(_t • I•
-~Jr)':r
J

unintcnL.ionaJ

___

1

liilLll 1 L,· ; r,r
or uJ t1 (:h
(EmrJ!J~,·,.l.s

In clarifying this rule, the

r:c c: 1 i

1, ,-; j-(J(-Jll

J ~-

Jl_l.-_,

{_'(_;);(I

IJC

l'

r_:}: Lc ;-- ;-,

L.

-aclucli .-)
P.cc;ta!c.~·':'_J('fl_l:_

comments suyc::

There is no general rule of lill·: thi1t OJW acts
at his ]Jeril in res;xci... to intcrfcJ-ulcc:_ 1·1i t·h
another's use or enjoywrnt of his lund, i:nc1, thccrcforc, 1·1hcn such interfcJ:cnccs ore !A:rcly i.1ccic1cnL1l,
the actor is not liable for causing th~m.
It is
only ~~en unintentional invasions are caused by
another's conduct which is negli <jCn t, rc"cklcc:s or
ultrahazardous that the law subjcci...s the actor to
lio.I.Jility.
Restatement of To:cts, §822, cornn:cnt at 233
Defenda~t

(1939).

could have been found liable to plaintiffs,

therefore:
(l)

If the harm was intentional or the activity

undertaken with knowledge that damage was substnntially
certain to follow, and the invasion was unreasonai.Jle.

Or,

(2)

If the conduct of Salt Lake County was negligent.

(3)

If the activity was of such a nature as to fall

Or,

fairly within the area of strict liability.
The issue of strict liability was discussed by this
court in the case of Stevens v. \i'onq, 123 Uto.h 309, 259
P. 2d 586

(1953).

There the plaintiff had occupied the

portion of a building.
directly above.

lo~er

The defendant occupied the space

The defendant's water pipe sprung a leak,

water seeped into the plaintiff's ceiling causing large
portions of plaster to fall.
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'l'J,c

l'l, · ;,1

1

f ;,_, cudlc ncicd lhilt strict lii1bili ty should

Th0 coult distinyuishcd a Californiil case which
applied stricL liability to the drilling of an oil well
in the follo·.1i nrJ

lanCjUiJ·~·~:

That cuse involved the drilling of an oil well
near a residence unC the drillers knc· or sho~ld
havE: knovrn th2:t no matter hm·1 careful tJ-.ey 1-1ere in
their opcrc,tions thiAt clamago might ensue fror-1 the
very natur~_e of the rnuttcr they 1-1ere dealing 1·.>ith.
The exrJericncc o;: rnunkind has not tauc;ht this to
be true of water in pipes.
123 Utah at 314, 259 P.2d at 588.
Similarly, the "experience of mankind" has not taught
that the opcrntion of a storm drain is likely to cause
danWCJe.
CONCLUSION
In adopting the Go1•ernmental Immunity Act, the legislature created a right of action which did not exist at
conu~on

law.

It did so provided certain conditions were met

and procedures were follo1-1ed by the claimant.

One of these

conditions is that a claim be filed within 90 days after the
cause of action arises.
It is clear that a cause of action arises or begins to
exisl the moment ull four elements of the cause (duty,
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neglis;ence, proximate cause and dc_u,,i:lge) are prcsc:nl.

In

this case all the elements I·IE::re present in the spri nCJ of
1971.

The notice was filed in the late

sun~er

of 1974.

The Legislatt're balanced the rights of injured persons
against the needs of governmental entities anc1 wrote a
statute without a provision for tolling until the cause of
damage is discovered.

It is the Court's duty to implement

that statute; not to write a new one of its own.
As a California court held in FidelL!J' and Deposit Co.
v. Claude Fisher Co., 327 P.2d 78

(Cal.App. 1958):

Statutes of limitation and the like, prescribing deiinite periods of time Wlthin which
actions rnLy be brought or certain steps taken
are, of necessity, adamant rather than flexible
in nature.
Such statutes are upheld and enforced
regardless of personal hardship, and they are
favored by the courts.
cited with approval, Roosendaal Const.

& Min. Corp. v. Holman,

2 8 Utah 2 d 3 9 6 , 50 3 P . 2 d 4 4 6 ( 19 72 ) .
Even if it were properly within the court's domain to
adopt a "discovery rule'', it should not be adopted in cases
such as this.

The purposes of a prompt notice may not

oubveigh the burden put upon plaintiffs in a case where a
surgeon leaves a foreign object in a patient's body.

There

the lack of problems of proof and the inherent difficulty in
discovering the malpractice may outweigh the need to bar old
claims.

Perhaps this Court should go as far as the California

court and adopt the discovery rule for all professional
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-lG-

rnnlpracticc.
in Grdlnnry

Dut certainly the rule should not be adopted
n~yligcncc

cnscs.

Even if the discovery rule is adopted for defective
structure

ca~cs,

it can only apply to latent defects, since

patent defects nrc readily discoverable by diligence.

The

Legislature has not seen fit to waive governmental immunity
for latent defects.
Third, even if the discovery rule were applied in this
case, the issue of when the defect "should have been discovered"
should have gone to the jury.
Last, the law is clear that this is not a proper case for
the application of strict liability.
Defendants request a reversal.
day of December, 1977.

Respectft,lly submitted this

SNOI·I, CHRISTENSEN

By

&

MARTINEAU

:::;u::HiJ CJMADQ)

Scott Daniels
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